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To start, I would like to thank Professor Paust for inviting the
International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) to participate in this
panel. Its subject is indeed closely linked to the I.C.R.C.
In my brief presentation, I would like to comment on the following
issues which are related to the theme of this panel: 1) Is present
humanitarian law still adapted to the needs of modem wars?; 2) How
should war criminals be prosecuted?; and finally 3) How safe can safe
areas be?
As most of you know, the I.C.R.C.'s activities are based on the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the statutes of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Its mandate is to protect and assist
victims of armed conflicts and internal disturbances.
First, the I.C.R.C. protects and assists the victims in the field. It
protects the civilian population, it visits prisoners of war and other
detained persons, provides food, medical and other assistance, reestablishes the link between separated family members through Red Cross
Messages, tries to find persons who went missing during the conflict, and
reunites family members.
Second, the I.C.R.C. is mandated by the international community
to act as promoter and guardian of international humanitarian law. Its
delegates in the field, which number about one thousand, monitor respect
of humanitarian law and, in the case of violations, they intervene with the
party concerned. These interventions are made at all levels. The I.C.R.C.
seeks to establish a constructive dialogue with all the parties concerned,
with governmental authorities as well as with armed opposition groups,
which, and this should be underlined, are also bound by humanitarian law.
This dialogue with the parties is the reason why the I.C.R.C. treats
its findings and representations in a discreet and confidential way. The
principle of confidentiality is thus not an end in itself, but rather a working
method. It has its limits: when severe violations of humanitarian law
continue even after the I.C.R.C. has intervened, it reserves the right to
denounce such violations publicly. The I.C.R.C. has made a more liberal
use of this policy in the last few years, in particular, during the war in the
former Yugoslavia.
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After these general comments, let me turn to the question of
whether present law is still adapted to the needs of modern warfare.
Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of many armed conflicts
has changed. Bosnia is a case on point We have witnessed there, I think
in particular of the atrocious policy of ethnic cleansing, types of behaviors
which were in complete contradiction with the most fundamental principles
of humanitarian law.
In Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic wars have claimed hundreds of
thousands of victims, and the present situation in Zaire is extremely
preoccupying.
In other parts of the world, such as Liberia, state structures
have
disintegrated and collapsed to a point where the total lack of discipline and
the apparently unlimited availability of light weapons make it impossible
for humanitarian organizations to work. Combatants, which often include
young children, do not fight for an ideology anymore, but for mere
survival.
What lessons should we draw from this grim picture? Is existing
law insufficient, and should we therefore advocate new law?
Let me say briefly that the mere fact that a rule is violated does not
mean that it is bad. This may sound trivial, but in the ongoing debate,
there is a widespread confusion between the quality of the rule and its
effective implementation. These are two different things. We are
convinced that humanitarian law offers adequate protection. The problem
is often a manifest lack of political will to apply the law.
When state structures disintegrate, the problem becomes more
specific, as civilian and military command lines, which are essential for the
respect of humanitarian law (and law in general), have ceased to exist.
There does not seem to be a ready-made solution for this problem. Better
law is certainly not a solution, as it would not be enforced. It is then
rather the responsibility of states to intervene, as humanitarian actors reach
the limits of their work. But this is a political, rather than a legal, issue.
Let me add that these situations of failed, disintegrated states are,
at least for the time being, not so frequent. They are certainly much less
frequent than people think! Take Bosnia: it was not in the process of
disintegration in the sense previously mentioned, even though this
argument was often used as an excuse. There was generally no lack of
command lines, as the violations of humanitarian law were mainly the
result of clear-cut policies. Forcing people to flee had become part of a
political strategy. Moreover, the rules of humanitarian law were often
well known.
So the problem is often more politicalthan legal. The parties to an
armed conflict have to accept more readily the application of humanitarian
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law.
At the same time, states have to assume their international
responsibility and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions as stipulated
in Common Article 1.
At the same time, one should remain pragmatic: the law may need
to be developed in certain specific fields. A case in point is the adoption,
in May of this year, of a Protocol prohibiting the use of blinding laser
weapons.' Its Protocol II on land-mines was also revised.
There has also been a debate on whether persons displaced within
their own country were sufficiently protected. The representative of the
Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis Deng, has
clarified the issue by publishing his Compilation and Analysis of Legal
Norms protecting the internally displaced. He came to the conclusion that
most of the protection needs of the internally displaced were adequately
covered.
Here again, what is lacking is the proper implementation of
existing rules: humanitarian and human rights law. Respect of that law
would help prevent many population displacements, because it is their
violation which forces entire populations to flee their homes.
Let me now turn briefly to the prosecution of war crimes. First, I
would like to recall that the Geneva Conventions introduced a system of
universal jurisdiction. This means that states have an obligation to
prosecute suspected war criminals. It is regrettable that this system has not
worked. The ad hoc tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are
an important step. This selective approach is, however, insufficient.
There is a need for a permanent international criminal court, as the present
impunity cannot last forever.
In the I.C.R.C.'s view, such a court should have the following
characteristics:
a) It should be complementary to national courts, the system of universal
jurisdiction should remain in place.
b) The court should also deal with internal, armed conflicts, and
prosecute those who have committed serious violations of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Protocol II of 1977, even
though these violations may not constitute grave breaches.
c) The court should be impartial and independent; the prosecutor should
be able to open investigations on his own initiative, and the court
should not have to obtain permission from concerned states.
d) The court should be independent from the Security Council, which
should not be able to block the activities of the court.
1. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons, Apr. 10, 1981, Protocol IV, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (1980).
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In order to have the system of universal jurisdiction work, it is
essential that states adopt proper national legislation allowing for the
prosecution of war crimes. In order to assist states, the I.C.R.C. has
recently set up an Advisory Service.
Lawyers based at I.C.R.C.
headquarters in Geneva, as well as experts based in the field, seek to assist
states in adopting such national laws.
To conclude, I would like to say a few words about the concept of
safe areas. When speaking about Bosnia, one. will of course remember the
tragic events surrounding the town of Srebrenica. Srebrenica had, though,
been declared a safe area by the Security Council. The question we have
to ask ourselves is: How safe can safe areas be?
When discussing this issue, it is important to clarify the terms
being used, as there exists quite some confusion.
The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols contain
several rules about the establishment of protected zones. They are
intended to protect the military sick and wounded, or the civilian
population, against hostilities. I cannot go into the details of such zones
here, and shall limit myself to say that these zones are based on the
consent of the parties. In addition, they have to be demilitarized, which
necessitates a strict control of the concerned zones.
In practice, there have been great difficulties in establishing such
protected zones because of the lack of trust between the fighting parties.
The I.C.R.C., on its part, has managed to create some neutralized zones,
though limited in space and in time.
The safe areas established by the United Nations are very different
in nature. They are imposed on the parties, as it happened in the former
Yugoslavia, on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The consequence of this is that these zones are very fragile, and need a
very strong protection force in order to be implemented. This was not the
case in Bosnia, where the United Nations protection forces were clearly
insufficient. Moreover, the zones in Bosnia were not even demilitarized,
and could, therefore, be seen as legitimate military targets.
We know the sad results. Not only were the people in these zones
not adequately protected, but, worse, the civilian population was given a
false sense of security and protection.
What lessons should we draw from this experience?
1) It is very difficult and risky to establish safe areas. That means that
one has to think twice before acting.
2) If special protection zones are to be created, the principles and rules
of humanitarian law should more readily be taken into account.
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If they have to be imposed, which may be justified in certain
instances, they should be completely demilitarized and effectively
protected. And, last but not least,
4) Humanitarian law protects the civilian population as a whole; zones
under special protection should under no circumstances undermine
this general immunity.

